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RECENT DECISIONS
Further importance of this resort of a tried and condemned war
criminal to the review of the Supreme Court of the United States is
found in the fact that similar procedures may be resorted to in the
case of the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals and, further, that
condemned Japanese General Mashura Homma whose trial followed
in time and location that of Yamashita resorted to similar and as unsuccessful steps to obtain writs of certiorari, habeas corpus, and prohibition after he had been condemned to death for permitting atrocities
to be committed by members of his command while he was commander
of Japanese forces in the Philippines. The crime for which he was
tried and condemned occurred in large part during the surrender of
American forces in the spring of 1942 and upon the subsequent notorious Bataan Death March. An interesting addition to his petition
that is not to be found so fully developed in the petition of Yamashita
is that the commission could not come to an enforceable decision since
the accuser was also the judge, that is, party to a trial in which it was
to give judgment.
James D. Sullivan.

QUINONEs v. LIFE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE Co. or TENNESSEE

(24 So. (2d) 270 ........ La-......
1945).- In one of the first cases of
its kind to reach the courts the judicial history of aviation took unto
itself another enlarging precedent. In Quinones v. Life and Casualty
Insurance Co. of Tennessee the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized
the rapid wartime development of the Army-Navy Air Transport Service to a position equalling, if not surpassing commercial airlines.
On Oct. 1, 1942, Dr. Pascasio Quinones, a member of the Medical
Corps of the United States Army was accidentally killed when a military plane in which he was riding crashed near the City of San Juan,
Puerto Rico. At the time of his death Dr. Quinones held a twenty
thousand dollar life insurance policy issued by the Life and Casualty
Company of Tennessee which named the six minor children of the
deceased as beneficiaries. In this case Mrs. Quinones, as tutrix and
on behalf of her minor children, seeks to recover the amount of the
policy from the insurance company.
The defendant insurance company answered the plaintiff by denying liability for the principal sum of the policy with two alternate defenses. The first defense, denying liability for any amount of the
principal sum of the policy, relied on the aviation clause of the policy;
the second defense, denying liability for more than one-fifth of the
principal sum of the policy, relied on the military service clause of
the policy.
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The court below rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
full amount of the policy and the defendant insurance company has
appealed from the decision.
The defendant argues that Dr. Quinones, at the time of his death,
was assuming risks which would not permit insurance coverage according to the policy's aviation and military clauses.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Dr. Quinones' actions
did fall within the coverage as permitted by the aviation and military
clauses and discussed first the facts which led the court to place the
Army-Navy Air Transport Service on the level of a commercial airline
as far as the aviation clause of the policy was concerned.
The facts disclosed that Dr. Quinones was a passenger on an airplane regularly operated by the United States Government between
Borinquin Field and the City of San Juan. The plane was one of
many used before the war for transportation purposes by commercial
airlines and after being requisitioned and slightly altered by the Army
was used to carry passengers and cargo on this route. The airfields on
this route were used 'by the Pan American Airways in conjunction with
the Army and Navy and compare favorably with civilian airfields in
the United States. The pilot was an experienced flyer having piloted
passenger planes at Borinquin Field for a year and a half prior to
the fatal accident. The passengers, members of the armed forces and
civilians, were authorized by the commanding officer of the field to
make this flight and Dr. Quinones was making the trip under military
orders to obtain some serum.
The aviation clause in the policy is as follows: "Aviation. Should
the death of the Insured result from operating, or riding in, any kind
of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed passenger
aircraft operated by a licensed pilot on a regular passenger route between definitely established airports, only the reserve under this policy
shall be payable and said reserve shall be in full settlement of all claims
hereunder."
The court pointed out that it recognized the rights of insurance
companies to limitations of liability contained in policies and noted
that the intention of the parties in the construction of these limiting
clauses must be controlling in determining the liability of the insurance
companies.
Since the airplane has been proved to be the same as that used by
the commercial airlines; the pilot as well qualified as any commercial
pilot; the flight regular over an established route and the airfields as
well equipped as civilian airports, the only remaining feature to be
considered is the fare-paying status of the passenger. It is a matter
of fact that Dr. Quinones enjoyed the privilege of travelling by airplane, by government car, or by train. If he had chosen to travel by
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train, the Army would have furnished him a railroad ticket and certainly he would have been considered a fare-paying passenger. It
seems fair, the court says, to conclude that no distinction should be
made between a passenger whose fare is paid directly or indirectly or
absorbed by his employer and a passenger who pays directly his
own fare.
With all of the qualifications of the aviation clauses satisfied there
is no reason why the insurance company should not be liable for the
principal sum stipulated in the policy.
The second defense of the insurance company contended that the
military service of the insured greatly reduced the principal sum to be
paid. However the court held that the limited liability of the insurance
company, as modified by its military service clause, pertained only to
those cases where the insured was enrolled in the military service with
no provision of such action being dealt with in the policy. The policy
of the deceased most certainly acknowledged his status as a serviceman and by its acknowledgment grants full recovery of the principal
sum, particularly when his death resulted from no hazards of combat.
Thomas Broden.

BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICE

FOR

MY

PEOPLE.-By

Ernst Frankenstein, Dial Press, New

York, 1944 - When Anne Morrow Lindbergh, in the days just before the war, impliedly sanctioned a "wave of the future," the most
active interventionists roundly damned her views as lacking courage
and idealism. In these days just following a war fought for four freedoms, when many a voice proclaims that the wave of the present now
engulfing eastern Europe must be accepted with "realism," it is most
refreshing to read a book which holds up the Atlantic Charter as a
basis of its argument.
We have recently received for review "Justice for My People" by
the celebrated international lawyer, Ernst Frankenstein. In brief, the
work deals with a problem perhaps more tortured today than ever
before: that of the seventeen million Jews on earth, a large number of
whom are now displaced, homeless, and living in the midst of hostile
populations. In concise language covering less than two hundred pages,
Mr. Frankenstein states what he believes to be the case for his people, "the test case for humanity."
Mr. Frankenstein, unlike some writers on international problems,
is not more fond of the problem than of the solution. He is most
specific as to the solution of the Jewish problem. It is "the estab-

